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BOOK REVIEWS
THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
AND THE GUILTY PLEA
By Abraham S. Goldstein
Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1981. Pp. xi, 104, notes, index.
$12.95.
Reviewed by Donald G. Gifford*
The prosecutor is the dominant figure within the criminal justice
system, yet courts and commentators traditionally have ignored the im-
pact of the prosecutor's discretionary choices. During the past two de-
cades, commentators, led by Kenneth Culp Davis, have begun to
acknowledge the significance of prosecutorial discretion and have
called for reforms based largely on internal controls such as written
guidelines.' In The Passive Judiciary. Prosecutorial Discretion and the
Guilty Plea, Abraham Goldstein, Sterling Professor of Law at Yale
University and the former Dean at that school, goes beyond these ear-
lier commentators and argues that courts must take the primary role in
protecting both defendants and the public against abuses of
prosecutorial discretion. Professor Goldstein suggests that because of
the prosecutor's partisan role within the adversary system, reliance
solely upon internal controls or the prosecutor's obligation as a "minis-
ter of justice"2 is misplaced (pp. 6-7). Goldstein disagrees with earlier
commentators who implied that courts are not able to play an effective
role in controlling abuses of prosecutorial discretion (p. 73). He points
to the anomaly of judges who are "imperial" elsewhere in asserting
control over executive authority, but who are "passive" in second-
guessing prosecutors' charging, dismissal and plea bargaining deci-
sions, decisions that courts should be comparatively well equipped to
deal with, according to Goldstein (pp. 55, 71).
The Passive Judiciary is based upon the Edward Douglass White
lectures delivered at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge, Loui-
siana in March, 1977. While disavowing any intent to "convert lectures
into treatise" (p. 1), Professor Goldstein nevertheless presents a com-
* Associate Professor and Director, Criminal Law Practice Program, University of Toledo
College of Law. B.A. 1973, College of Wooster, J.D. 1976, Harvard University.
I. See, e.g., 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 279-80 (2d ed. 1978); Abrams,
Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1
(1971); Bubany & Skillem, Taming the Dragon: An Administrative Lawfor Prosecutorial De-
cision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473, 495-505 (1976); Noll, Controlling .4 Prosecutor's
Screening Discretion Through Fuller Enforcement, 29 SYRACUSE L. REv. 697, 707-12 (1978);
Thomas & Fitch, Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 507, 518-22 (1976).
2. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 3.8, Comment (1981).
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prehensive and well-documented overview of the formal exercises of
prosecutorial discretion within the criminal process. Included in the
discussion are the prosecutor's discretionary choices in charging (pp. 3-
11), in granting dismissals or nolle prosequi (pp. 25-32), and in plea
bargaining (pp. 33-51).
Professor Goldstein begins by describing the nature of prosecutorial
discretion. In deciding whether to charge a suspect with a crime or
whether to accept a plea to a lesser offense, the prosecutor considers not
only whether there is sufficient evidence to prove that an offense has
been committed, but also "equitable" and "practical" factors such as
the circumstances of the instant offense, the offender's past record, the
defendant's potential cooperation with law enforcement authorities,
and the prosecutor's attitude toward the statute in question. Courts
have been reluctant to review these decisions. As Professor Goldstein
remarks. "the courts seem almost to have forgotten principles of legal-
ity which they have enforced energetically elsewhere in the criminal
law" (p. 5). When victims of crimes seek to compel prosecution, courts
find that victims lack "standing" (p. 4).4 When a defendant charged
with a crime claims unequal treatment in the charging process, the
courts hold that unequal treatment does not constitute a constitutional
violation unless motivated by considerations of race, religion, or a de-
sire to prevent the exercise of constitutional rights (p. 10).1 Even when
a defendant alleges such a violation, Professor Goldstein finds such
"norms of equality and rationality .. .difficult to enforce in the
courts" (p. 11).6
Professor Goldstein locates the origins of judicial reluctance to re-
view charging decisions in the history of judicial review of the prosecu-
tor's dismissal or termination of charges (pp. 12-24). Traditionally,
courts did not review the prosecutor's decision to nolle charges; polit-
ical accountability was regarded as a sufficient check on the prosecu-
tor's actions. Professor Goldstein traces the development of reform in
the early twentieth century, when courts for the first time assumed con-
siderable control over the termination of charges. He notes that this
movement toward greater judicial involvement, however, has been
halted by separation of powers concerns of a constitutional dimension.
Professor Goldstein uses Judge Edward Weinfeld's description of the
separation of powers issue as an example of the contemporary judicial
approach (p. 20). Judge Weinfield says that if the prosecutor's motion
to dismiss were denied "The court in that circumstance would be with-
out power to issue a mandamus or other order to compel prosecution of
the indictment, since such a direction would invade the traditional sep-
3. See Gifford, Equal Protection and the Prosecutor's Charging Decision.: Enforcing an Ideal, 49
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 659, 674-85, 709-16 (1981).
4. See, e.g., Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 616-17 (1973).
5. See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962); United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207,
1211 (2d Cir. 1974).
6. See also Gifford, supra note 3, at 674-78.
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aration of powers doctrine."7 The discussion of the separation of pow-
ers issue is critical to Professor Goldstein's analysis. He believes this
concern to be the primary articulated reason for judicial reluctance to
review not only the prosecutor's dismissals, but also the charging and
plea bargaining decisions (pp. 51, 53). Professor Goldstein argues that
separation of power concerns should not prevent judicial review of the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion (p. 54).
After a brief overview of the interplay of prosecutor and judge in
conferring immunity from prosecution (pp. 25-32), Professor Goldstein
turns his attention to judicial oversight of plea bargaining. Professor
Goldstein avoids the error made by most courts and commentators
who believe that because everyone-prosecutors and defense attor-
neys-consents to plea bargains, it therefore follows that the process is
legitimate and desirable.8 Professor Goldstein eloquently describes this
illusion of legitimacy by consent:
... everyone appears to benefit. The defendant avoids the risk of a
heavier sentence than he in fact receives; his counsel obtains his fee
with less effort; the prosecutor obtains a conviction without risking ac-
quittal at trial; and the state determines guilt more economically be-
cause it is not put to its constitutional burden of proof. The only loser
may be the public interest in maintaining a system of criminal justice
based on complete accuracy and a constitutional procedure (p. 33).
Professor Goldstein rejects what he describes as the Supreme Court's
"marketplace" model of plea bargaining (p. 37). He is concerned with
the effect that inaccurate pleas-pleas that do not reflect the nature of
the seriousness of the offense-have on sentencing and parole decisions
and on statistical analysis of criminal activity. The result of routine
plea bargaining, according to Professor Goldstein, is to frustrate the
legislative purpose of how designated offenses are to be treated (p. 45).9
Because the buyers and the sellers in the market place of plea bar-
gaining are not protecting correctional objectives in plea bargains, Pro-
fessor Goldstein calls for a more active role for the judiciary to assure
that the guilty plea is entered to a charge which accurately reflects the
offense committed (p. 45). He argues that "the nature and meaning of
a statutory body of criminal law" cannot be "left to partisans inevitably
captive of their role" (pp. 45-6). However, in making this analysis, Pro-
fessor Goldstein fails to recognize that the trial judge also is a "captive
of his role" who wants to dispose of cases expeditiously through plea
bargaining and who is not in the best position to prevent defendants
7. United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt & Neckwear Contractors Association, 228 F. Supp.
483, 489-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
8. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750-53 (1969); United States v. Krasn, 614
F.2d 1229, 1233 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Swinehart, 614 F.2d 853, 858 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied 449 U.S. 827 (1980); Church, In Defense of Bargain Justice, 13 LAw & Soc'y REv.
509, 511-13 (1979).
9. See Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion,
1983 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 37, 66-70 (1983).
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from pleading to offenses not reflecting the seriousness of their
activities.' 0
Professor Goldstein appears to be urging the abolition of plea bar-
gaining in most cases, except where the prosecutor cannot prove the
original charges (pp. 45-47). He suggests that the sentencing judge can
accommodate most of the current objectives of plea bargaining, includ-
ing individualizing justice and encouraging cooperation with law
enforcement authorities, through sentencing concessions. Implementa-
tion of Professor Goldstein's approach would substantially reduce plea
bargaining because in most plea bargains the primary factor is the
prosecutor's attempt to individualize justice by taking into account the
circumstances of the offense and the characteristics of the offender,II
factors which Professor Goldstein would disallow. This significant re-
duction in plea bargaining, according to Professor Goldstein, can be
accomplished by judicial rejection of plea bargains. He does not ad-
dress the feasibility of this approach in view of the judicial self-interest
in encouraging plea bargaining.
Having described the important roles played by prosecutorial dis-
cretion in the criminal process and the current unwillingness of courts
to review the exercise of such discretion, Professor Goldstein's solution
is more active judicial scrutiny of dismissals and grants of immunity, as
well as plea bargains. He suggests that prosecutors be forced to offer a
"rational explanation" when making such a decision (p. 60). The court
would then review the prosecutor's decision and the articulated expla-
nation to ensure that the prosecutor's decision is rationally related to a
legitimate law enforcement objective and is consistent with the way
similar offenders have been treated (pp. 58-67). Professor Goldstein
acknowledges that because such requirements would be met with
strong institutional pressures from prosecutors, judges may need to in-
dependently investigate the facts of the case by reviewing the prosecu-
tor's files and even by calling witnesses to testify at hearings (pp. 68-
69). Professor Goldstein forsees that gradually a "common law of
prosecutorial discretion" will develop to guide prosecutors' discretion-
ary decisions and judicial review of such decisions.
Professor Goldstein makes an important contribution when he sug-
gests that the victims of crimes be given a greater role in formally par-
ticipating in decisions on dismissals, charge reductions, guilty pleas and
sentencing (pp. 70-73). 2 This new role for the victim apparently would
10. Professors Rossett and Cressey describe the trial judge as one member of the "Committee on
Criminal Justice":
In that system, a single judge, prosecutor and public defender serve the same court-
room, collectively processing all the felony cases coming into it. The three members
of the committee work with each other daily, face-to-face, sometimes for years. These
justice committees, like all committees, develop stereotyped routines which get cases
processed but which give only passing individual attention to each.
A. ROSSETT & D. CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT 173 (1976).
11. See Gifford, supra note 9, at 42-45.
12. For similar suggestions that victims be given a role in the plea bargaining and sentencing
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be to offer testimony and informal input to the judge before the judge
approves the prosecutor's decision (p. 69). Professor Goldstein under-
stands the important role of the victim in breaking up the consensus
achieved by the "Committee of Justice":' 3 "It would provide the judge
with a party who has a genuine interest in challenging and correcting
the version of facts and law proferred by the prosecutor or defense
counsel or both" (p. 73).
Professor Goldstein's central thesis is that courts possess the compe-
tence, and indeed the obligation, to review prosecutorial discretion. He
correctly and expressly rejects "the error of most recent commentators"
who, according to Goldstein's view, argue that the judiciary "cannot
play an effective role" in controlling prosecutorial discretion (p. 73). In
itself, it is an important contribution for a scholar of Professor Gold-
stein's magnitude to be urging courts to be more active in scrutinizing
prosecutorial discretion. One can hope that the judiciary heeds Profes-
sor Goldstein's call to arms, and if they do, The Passive Judiciary is an
immensely important book.
The difficulty with The Passive Judiciary is that it promises too
much for the courts' ability to oversee prosecutorial discretion. Profes-
sor Goldstein is correct when he suggests that the real explanation for
judicial resistance to supervision of prosecutorial discretion is concern
about the institutional competence of the judiciary to undertake this
task (pp. 54-55).14 Professor Goldstein passes over these difficulties too
lightly, however, when he states that "the prosecutor's decisions are no
more intricate than others routinely dealt with by judges" (p. 55). Ad-
mittedly, the problem of institutional competence is not one of exper-
tise; the judiciary is well qualified to pass upon questions of the
sufficiency of evidence and the appropriateness of considering mitigat-
ing factors in handling the defendant's case. The difficulty in judicial
review of prosecutorial discretion rather stems from two interrelated
factors largely ignored by Professor Goldstein.
First, the development of a workable body of common law gov-
erning prosecutorial discretion is not administratively feasible. When
justifying his decision to dismiss a charge or to accept a plea to a lesser
offense, the prosecutor might routinely state that there is not sufficient
evidence to convict the defendant on the original charge. For the judge
processes, see N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 55-57 (1974); A. ROSsETr & D.
CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT 174 (1976); Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining:
The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 37, 90-95 (1983). A number
of jurisdictions formally allow victims some input into these decisions. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 921.143 (West Supp. 1982); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.40 (McKinney (1981).
Studies suggest that victim input is feasible, and that victims generally are not intransigent
when involved in the process. See W. KERSTETTER & A. HEINZ, PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT
CONFERENCE: AN EVALUATION 44-46, 131 (1978).
13. Professor Goldstein describes the often accommodative relationship between prosecutor and
defense attorney as follows: "By the time the matter is presented to a court, defense counsel
and prosecutor may no longer be at odds; they may be in agreement and have a stake in
blurring the underlying facts." (p. 70). See also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
14. See also Gifford, supra note 3, at 682-85.
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to independently verify the lack of sufficient evidence may be impossi-
ble, and at the very least is difficult and would involve hearings ap-
proaching full-blown trials in length and complexity. To develop "a
common law" of prosecutorial discretion would require the trial court
to write an opinion when ruling on a motion to dismiss or when ap-
proving a plea bargain; meaningful common law requires written opin-
ions to be used as precedents and presumably appellate review. 15
While it is true, as Professor Goldstein argues, that courts frequently
address issues that are more complex, the difficulty of judicial overview
obviously is increased enormously when this judicial inquiry may be
required in even the most trivial of the hundreds of thousands of crimi-
nal cases each year which involve dismissals or plea bargains.
The second factor making judicial review difficult is the wide vari-
ety of factors the prosecutor may consider in deciding to dismiss a
charge or to plea bargain, including the sufficiency of the evidence, the
defendant's cooperation with law enforcement authorities, and equita-
ble factors such as the circumstances of the offense and the characteris-
tics of the offender. In all or almost all cases, the prosecutor will be
able to justify his decisions as rationally related to some law enforce-
ment objective.16 Professor Goldstein's requirement of a reasoned ex-
planation, without more, will do little other than to grant a judicial
imprimatur to the prosecutor's decision. Professor Goldstein virtually
admits this point when he states that most prosecutorial strategies
"would be upheld because they are rational accommodations of over-
lapping or conflicting statutes and available resources" (p. 63). Profes-
sor Goldstein apparently would restrict the objectives of plea
bargaining and would disallow plea bargains justified by the prosecutor
on the grounds of equitable factors relating to the circumstances of the
offense or the characteristics of the offender. Such an attempt to re-
strict plea bargains probably would fail, as similar restrictions in the
past have failed, because it is in the institutional interests of prosecu-
tors, defense attorneys, and judges to undermine such bans. 7
Throughout this book Professor Goldstein appears to discourage re-
liance on internal controls over prosecutorial discretion, such as guide-
lines, and urges instead the remedy of judicial review (pp. 52, 73). Yet
ultimately, it is a combination of internal controls and judicial review
15. For detailed discussions of the requirement of written opinions as an essential element of
common law adjudication, see generally W. REYNOLDS, JUDICIAL PROCESS 57-61 (1980);
Reynolds & Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent - Limited Publication and No-Cita-
tion Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1167, 1189-94 (1978).
16. See generally Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE
L.J. 1205, 1208, 1235-49 (1970).
17. See generally, e.g., M. RUBINSTEIN, S. CLARKE & T. WHITE, ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAIN-
ING 17-28, 237-38 (1980); Church, Plea Bargains, Concessions and the Courts: Analysis of a
Quasi-Experiment, 10 L. & Soc. REV. 377, 384-400 (1976); Heumann & Loftin, Mandatory
Sentencing and the Abolition of Plea Bargaining: The Michigan Felony Firearm Statute, 13 L.
& Soc. REv. 393, 416-24 (1979); Mathey, Some Determinants ofthe Methods ofCase Disposi-
tion: Decision-Making by Public Defenders in Los Angeles, 8 L. & Soc. REV. 187, 190 (1973).
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which will allow for meaningful judicial scrutiny of the prosecutor's
discretionary choices in plea bargaining and in dismissals. Specific
guidelines listing factors that the prosecutor can take into account and
indicating the legal consequences warranted by the presence of each
factor are necessary if courts are to be able to decide that the prosecu-
tor's decision is not "rational." Some reliance on prosecutors' willing-
ness and ability to police themselves, except in egregious cases when
the judiciary should intervene, is necessary if the control of
prosecutorial discretion is ever to become a reality. In his concluding
paragraphs, Professor Goldstein reaches this synthesis himself and
talks about combining "formal rules," reasoned explanations and judi-
cial review. Ultimately Professor Goldstein does not urge a mutually
exclusive or competing way to control prosecutorial discretion, but
rather a shift in emphasis away from exclusive reliance on prosecutors'
ability to govern themselves and toward mutual obligations to be
shared by courts and prosecutors.
With its origins in a stimulating series of lectures, The Passive Judi-
ciary does not purport to offer a detailed prescription for how the judi-
ciary should control prosecutorial discretion. Nor does Professor
Goldstein's book offer precisely the mixture of internal controls and
judicial mechanisms which this reviewer believes is most feasible.1 8
What it does do is identify the exercise of prosecutorial discretion as an
important area that courts have been reluctant to review and to argue
effectively that the articulated reasons for judicial abdication are not
convincing. These accomplishments alone make The Passive Judiciary
a very important contribution and required reading for judges and
prosecutors alike.
18. See generally, Gifford, supra note 9, at 74-90; Gifford, supra noie 3, at 685-709.
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THE EDUCATION OF DAVID STOCKMAN AND OTHER
AMERICANS.
By William Greider
New York: E.P. Dutton, Inc., 1982. Pp. xxx, 159, appendix. $5.95 paper.
Reviewed by Jeanne J. Swartz* and Thomas R. Swartz**
If you have read William Greider's essay in The Atlantic entitled
"The Education of David Stockman,"1 skip this book. Fully one-half
of this short book is a reproduction of that article. The remainder of
the book represents an inadequate attempt by Greider and his pub-
lisher, E.P. Dutton, Inc., to justify reprinting this article in book form.
However, if you have not read Greider's essay, which shook the pub-
lie's confidence in the Reagan Administration in December 1981, then
this book is highly recommended. Although Greider does not appear
to fully recognize it, his essay may be more relevant today than it was
eighteen months ago when it first appeared in print. The continued
relevance of Greider's essay raises at least three conspicuous questions
which the author fails to address:
(1) Why is the Stockman story still relevant eighteen months after it
first appeared in print?
(2) What does it tell us about current policy?
(3) Does it provide any valuable insights into President Reagan's pol-
icy during the second half of his first term of office?
Greider would have us examine the appearance of his original article
as a moment in history. To this end, he provides the reader with the
blue-print that Stockman brought with him to the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (pp. 139-59) and the reasons why Stockman would be
so candid in his remarks (pp. xiii-xxx).
Greider's book pleads for you to remember Greider's moment in
the sun. He wants you to remember that it was his article that forced
the teary-eyed Stockman to face the national media and explain that
his luncheon with the President was "more in the nature of a visit to the
woodshed after supper."' Greider wants you to remember that it was
his article that gave us all those damning quotes:
We are interested in curtailing weak claims rather than weak cli-
* Chief Judge, St. Joseph Superior Court, St. Joseph County, Indiana. B.A., Chestnut Hill
College, 1961; J.D. Notre Dame Law School, 1975.
** Professor of Economics, University of Notre Dame. B.A., LaSalle College, 1960; M.A., Ohio
University, 1962; Ph.D., Indiana University, 1965.
1. Greider, The Education of David Stockman, ATLANTIC, Dec. 1981, at 27.
2. Transcript of Stockman's Statement and News Conference, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1981. at 38,
col. 1.
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ents. . . We have to show that we are willing to attack power-
ful clients with weak claims (p. 13).
Laffer sold us a bill of goods (p. 16).
I don't have time, trying to put this whole package together in three
weeks, so you just start making snap judgments. (p. 28).
The defense budget. . . (is) a kind of swamp of $10 to $20 to $30 bil-
lion worth of waste that can be ferreted out if you really push
hard (p. 25).
Equity ornaments (p. 26).
None of us really understands what's going on with all these numbers
(p. 33).
I'm just not going to spend a lot of political capital solving some other
guy's problem in (the year) 2010 (p. 41).
I don't believe too much in the momentum theory any more (p. 44).
I have a new theory-there are no real conservatives in Congress (p.
44).
I've never believed that just cutting taxes alone will cause output and
employment to expand (p. 49).
But, I mean, Kemp-Roth was always a Trojan horse to bring down the
top rate (p. 49).
It's kind of hard to sell 'trickle down'. so the supply-side formula
was the only way to get a tax policy that was really 'trickle
down'. Supply-side is 'trickle down' theory (p. 50).
Defense is setting itself up for a big fall (p. 61).
Some of the naive supply-siders just missed the whole dimen-
sion. . . You don't stop inflation without some kind of disloca-
tion. . . The supply-siders have gone too far (p. 65).
Whenever there are great strains or changes in the economic sys-
tem. . .it tends to generate crackpot theories, which then find
their way into legislative channels. (p. 66).
These are the words that have appeared and reappeared in our popular
press. However, if we are to benefit from "Stockman's education," we
must go beyond the shock value of these words and see if they provide
us a glimpse of future policy initiatives.
What is most apparent in the Greider interviews with Stockman is
the fact that Reaganomics was premised on faith. The public had to
believe. If the public did believe, President Reagan's "economic mira-
cle" might have become a reality while he was still in his first year in
office. However, it soon became clear that one key group did not have
the necessary faith-the business community. They did not respond to
these new policies by rushing into the marketplace and investing. In-
stead the rate of business investment steadily fell during 1981 and 1982
as business decision makers responded to high interest rates and the
presence of inflationary pressures which they believed to still throttle
our domestic economy.
The more time that passes, the less confidence the public will have
in this policy. Since more than two years have now passed and the
economy still has not responded, it is unlikely that a "miracle" will be
1983]
Journal of Legislation
witnessed. However, that does not mean that the Reagan administra-
tion will chart a new course. Reagan administration officials want to
believe in this policy. They want it to succeed-for them, it is inti-
mately intertwined with their philosophic roots or as Stockman says
their view of "how the world works".
If supply-side economics does not set in motion a massive burst of
economic activity, then we are likely to encounter some very predict-
able economic conditions. First and foremost will be the presence of
record-breaking deficits. Some Reagan estimates suggest that his first
budget year-fiscal 1982-resulted in a budget deficit in excess of $100
billion and that budget deficits will climb as high as $182 billion in
fiscal 1983 and as much as $233 billion in fiscal 1985, unless public
policy is dramatically changed. In the face of these deficits, relatively
few policy options are available to the Reagan Administration. One
policy option, however, is obvious. The Administration will continue
to plea for further reductions in domestic spending.
The Administration has embarked upon a rather interesting course
of action. Instead of maintaining an optimistic proffle, it has chosen to
convey a highly pessimistic countenance. This serves two purposes.
First, when the economy begins to recover, the Reagan Administration
can claim that its policies are working even better than expected. Sec-
ond, and perhaps more importantly, these pessimistic forecasts exag-
gerate the financial plight of two major domestic expenditure
programs: Social Security and Medicare/Medicaid. The Administra-
tion's posture allows it to argue for much deeper cuts in these programs
than would be the case if it was forecasting a far more vigorous
recovery.
It must be kept in mind, however, that crying wolf may indeed be
the only option this administration has left. For without a robust eco-
nomic recovery, even deep cuts in these "sacred cows" will do little to
offset the projected budget deficits. Stockman is abundantly clear on
this point: "Once you set aside defense and Social Security, the Medi-
care complex, and a few other sacred cows of minor dimension, like the
VA and the FBI, you have less than $200 billion worth of discretionary
room-only $144 billion after you cut all easy discretionary programs
this year" (p. 39). That is, after the spending cuts of the first year, you
would have to "zero out" all other domestic programs and make deep
cuts in Social Security and Medicare/Medicaid if you were to eliminate
the $233 billion deficit that Reagan's people are now forecasting.
Without an economic program to stimulate the economy there are no
easy answers. By now even the most dedicated Reagan supporters now
understand this basic fact. In Stockman's words, "they really thought
you could find $144 billion worth of waste, fraud and abuse" (p. 40).
In summary, Greider's essay not only provided headlines when it
was released in December, 1981, but it provides a benchmark by which
we can interpret current policy. It should be clear even to the uniniti-
[Vol. 10:442
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ated, that the Administration's economic stimulus programs have
failed. We as a nation did not have the necessary faith. The economy
will recover, but its recovery will only provide proof that even a disas-
terous public policy can not long dampen the immense energy of our
economic system. What remains for this Administration? Stockman et
al. will continue to strip away as many domestic programs as they can
before their time runs out. How will they justify this? If you have to
ask that question, perhaps you should buy this book and reread
Greider's essay.
